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DESIGNATION OF THE PARTIES
The

Plaintiffs-Appellees

are

JAMES

LOVENDAHL,

SUE

LOVENDAHL and WESLEY LOVENDAHL, all natural persons and
residents of Riverton, Salt Lake County, Utah.
The Defendant JORDAN SCHOOL DISTRICT is a political
subdivision and body politic of the State of Utah, having
primary responsibility to administer and operate a public
school system for a portion of Salt Lake County.
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT
Jurisdiction

of

the Utah

Supreme

Court

is

granted

pursuant to the provision of Section 78-2-2(3) (j) , Utah Code
[appeals from district court].
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
This appeal (and the predicate factual and procedural
situation involving this case) presents the following issues
for review:
1.

Whether the trial

summary

judgment

when

court erred
the

in granting

Defendant

School

District did not show that it was entitled "as a
matter of law" to judgment, specifically:
a.

that the School District's routine

disposal

of

everyday

"sewage",

4
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as

a

product

of

the

restroom

facilities

(toilets and sinks) as well as the foodpreparation facilities in the elementaryschool cafeteria, into and through the
sanitary sewer collection system falls
under the "exception" to the waiver of
governmental immunity under Section 6330-10(18) (c) ["mitigating, or handling
hazardous

materials

or

hazardous

wastes"], when the "domestic sewage" is
not so regulated by the state or federal
governments and said state and federal
regulations specifically exclude domestic
sewage from regulation.
b.

whether or not hydrogen sulfide gas,

as

a

natural

bi-product

of

the

putrif ication of "domestic sewage" within
the

sanitary

sewer

system

from

the

Riverton Elementary School, is, as a
matter of law, a "hazardous material" for
which

immunity

Subsection

is

retained

under

63-30-10(18)(c), Utah Code

[immunity exceptions]
5
STEPHEN G HOMER

2.

Whether the trial court erred in granting

summary judgment when genuine issues of fact would
otherwise

prevent

the

granting

of

summary

judgment. The disputed issues of fact include but
are not limited to:
a.

whether or not "hydrogen sulfide"

within

the

statute

meaning

is

as

of

the

a matter

of

immunity
fact

actually "regulated" in fact when the
District provided no permits from the
national EPA or the state Department of
Environmental

Quality

indicating

the

District was allowed to handle or dispose
of the "regulated" chemical.
b.

whether

property
"damaged"

or

was
for

not

the

factually
public

Plaintiff's
"taken"

use

by

or
the

Defendant's disposal activities of the
claimed "hazardous materials".
3,

Whether the trial court erred in ruling that

the "exception" under 63-30-10(18)(c)
retained

for

handling

"hazardous

[immunity

materials"]

overrides the "waivers" of immunity under Sections
6
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63-30-10.5 ["inverse condemnation"], as well as
the

constitutionality

of

such

"retention

of

immunity" in light of the provisions of Article I,
Section 22 of the Utah Constitution.
4.

Whether the trial court erred in ruling that

the "exception" under 63-30-10(18) (c) [immunity
retained

for

handling

"hazardous

materials"]

overrides the "waivers" of immunity under Sections
63-30-8

[defective

improvements]

and

63-30-9

[dangerous conditions]
5.

Whether the state-promulgated administrative

regulations pertaining to "clean air within the
classrooms" provide the District from immunity
from

Plaintiffs'

claims

for

"nuisance"

and

"inverse condemnation".
STANDARD OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
The interpretation and application of provisions of the
state and national constitutions as well as Utah statute by
the trial court are matters of law. The trial court's
conclusions

of

law

in

civil

cases

are

reviewed

for

correctness. United Park City Mines Company vs Greater Park
City Company, 870 P.2d 880, 885 (Utah Supreme Court 1993);
Society of Separationists, Inc. vs Taggart, 862 P.2d 1339,
7
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1341 (Utah Supreme Court 1993).
This standard of review has also been referred to as a
"correction of error standard". Jacobsen Investment Company
vs State Tax Commission, 839 P. 2d 789, 790 (Utah Supreme
Court 1992);

Sanders vs Ovard, 838 P.2d 1134, 1135 (Utah

Supreme Court 1992). "Correction of error" means that no
particular deference is given to the trial court's ruling on
questions of law. State vs Pena, 869 P. 2d 932, 936 (Utah
Supreme Court 19 94); Provo River Water Users' Association vs
Morgan, 857 P.2d 927, 931 (Utah Supreme Court 1993). The
"correction of error" standard means that the appellate
court decides the matter for itself and does not defer in
any degree to the trial judge's determination of law. State
vs Deli, 861 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah Supreme Court 1993) ; Howell
vs Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah Court of Appeals 1993) .
In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the appellate
court accords no deference to the trial court, but reviews
the trial court's conclusions of law for correctness. Kranz
vs Holt, 819 P. 2d 352 (Utah 1991) . The appellate court views
the facts and

inferences

therefrom

in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party opposing summary judgment.
Kranz, supra;
1084,

1086

Guardian State Bank vs Humpherys, 7 62 P.2d
(Utah

1988);

Horgan
8
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vs

Industrial

Design

Corporation, 657 P.2d 751, 752 (Utah 1982).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The

Plaintiffs'

essentially

those

uncompensated

claims
of

against

(1)

the

Defendant

"nuisance"

"taking or damaging

and

(2)

are
an

of private property

without payment of just compensation".
The claims arise

from the Defendant's

actions in

installing, maintaining and operating a sewer vent pipe,
upon

which

an

electrically-powered

blower

unit

was

installed, unreasonably interfered with the Plaintiffs' use
of their real estate and residential dwelling located a few
feet away from the sewer vent pipe.
The operative facts behind this litigation are not, per
se, in genuine dispute:
1.

The School District

as the owner/operator of

the Riverton Elementary School on a 12-acre site
in Riverton, Salt Lake County
undesirable
emanating
connected

"sewer
from

to

gas"

the

faced a problem of
smells,

apparently

sewage-collection

the newly-constructed

system

elementary

school1. The District, attempting to solve the
lr

The sewer gas "smell" was almost immediately noticeable when
the newly-constructed elementary school was first opened for
classes in about 1996.
9
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"smell" problem, claimed for years
2000

from 1996 to

that the gases, smells and odors were not

harmful. In 1996 the District installed a "sewer
vent pipe", approximately 10 inches in diameter
and approximately 20 feet high, atop which was
located an electrically-power blower fan to suck
the gases, vapors and odors from the "sanitary
sewer lateral" from the Elementary School and
discharge

those

gases

uncontrolled

into

the

atmosphere. The "sewer vent pipe" was located
hundreds of feet from the school building, but a
mere 17 feet from the Plaintiffs7 single-family
residential

dwelling.

The

Plaintiffs

almost

immediately thereafter complained.
2.

In May 1997 the Plaintiffs filed a formal

"notice of claim" for the "nuisance" and related
legal

injuries

and

issues. The

District

did

nothing. In December 1997 the instant litigation
was filed. The District still did nothing: it
continued to "vent" the sewer pipe through the
powered fan.
3.

In February 1998 the District, ostensibly

unable to ascertain the cause of the offensive
10
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"sewer gas" odors within the Elementary School,
"closed" the Riverton Elementary School, forcing
the

bussing

students

for

of
a

approximately
period

of

eight

hundred

approximately

four

months, to other schools within the District. The
District continued to operate the sewer vent pipe
and blower adjacent to Plaintiffs' residence.
4.

In March 1998

after almost TWO YEARS of

conscious inaction and only when facing in the
District Court a "preliminary injunction" hearing
LATER THAT DAY

did the District finally agree to

"cap" the sewer vent pipe. Subsequently to the
issuance of the preliminary injunction directing
the District to "cap" the vent pipe, the District
removed

the

piping

and

blower

unit

and

has

apparently permanently sealed the opening to the
sewer

line. That

cessation

of

the nuisance-

activity and the "capping" of the vent pipe
particularly when under court order to do so
does not, however, excuse the District's liability
for its previous tortious conduct and the damages
resulting therefrom.
5.

In November 2000 the District
11
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in a major

departure from its historic, publicly-proclaimed
position (that the odors, albeit annoying, were
NOT harmful to the students or the public)
announced

and

claimed

that

the

sewer gases,

including the hydrogen sulfide ("rotten egg gas"),
within

the

sanitary

sewer

drain

system

were

"hazardous materials" and that the District was
thus immune from suit under the provisions of
Section 63-30-10(18), Utah Code.
6.

In December 2000 the District Court conducted

an oral argument hearing and ultimately granted (8
February 2001) the Defendant's Motion for Partial
Summary

Judgment,

dismissing

the

Plaintiff's

remaining claims. [Many of the Plaintiffs' claims
had been previously dismissed under governmental
immunity grounds.]
ARGUMENT
I
THE DEFENDANT JORDAN SCHOOL DISTRICT
IS NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT
BECAUSE THE DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT
AS A MATTER OF LAW
Rule 56, U.R.Civ.P., requires that before the moving
party is entitled to summary judgment, there must be (1) no
genuine dispute as to material fact AND (2) the moving party
12
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is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In this case,
the Defendant submitted no "affidavits", but relied instead
on

an

illogical

and,

as

will

jurisprudentially-inaccurate

be

shown,

sloppy

and

reading of the Governmental

Immunity Act to justify its position.
The Defendant acknowledged that the materials contained
within

the

sewer

line

(which

it

intentionally

vented)

approximately 17 feet from the Plaintiffs' residence, are
"harmful
District

and

hazardous

materials".

Nevertheless,

the

attempted to shield itself under the cloak of

"governmental immunity" under Section 63-30-10(18) of the
Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
A
THE JORDAN SCHOOL DISTRICT,
HAVING NO STATUTORY RESPONSIBILITY
FOR THE REGULATION, MITIGATION OR HANDLING
OF "HAZARDOUS MATERIALS", IS NOT WITHIN
THE CLASS OF GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES FOR WHICH
IMMUNITY FROM SUIT WAS CONTEMPLATED
The Defendant JORDAN SCHOOL DISTRICT is a governmental
unit, created and charged with the responsibility to operate
and administer a public school system, for the education of
children in kindergarten through high school. The District
has NO STATUTORY RESPONSIBILITY OR MANDATE to handle or
regulate "hazardous waste", as such, and is thus not within
the "class" of Utah governmental agencies
13
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such as the

Department of Environmental Quality and the Department of
Health

which are so statutorily charged and created.

Obviously, the Legislature intended to shield those
agencies from the potentially-extraordinary

claims

(for

negligence and/or liability) in this field. The Legislature
did not intend the grant of immunity to extend to a local
school district, negligently operating the sewage disposal
system

from

its

toilets,

sinks

and

food-preparation

facilities, from suit for nuisance arising from the damaging
effect

intentionally

inflicted

upon

an

adjacent

propertyowner!
In this context the argument and assertion of the
District (as to entitlement to immunity) is similar to those
unsuccessful arguments raised by other governmental entities
operating OUTSIDE of their limited area of responsibility.
In Williams vs Board of Education, 780 P.2d 818 (Utah
Supreme Court 1989)] , the school district

that this was a

school district is merely coincidence, because the argument
could likely have been advanced by any governmental agency--argued that the run-off of stormwaters onto the "downhill11
adjoining propertyownei: was immunized from suit, by reason
of

the Act, because

the district was

engaged

in the

"management of floodwaters". This hypertechnical argument
14
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WAS REJECTED by the Supreme Court, which found that immunity
for such "nuisance" claims had been waived pursuant to the
provisions of Section 63-3 0-9, Utah Code. The Court wrote:
We do not need to reach here the question of
whether the second paragraph of section 63-30-3
provides "absolute immunity" for the flood control
activities of governmental entities.
That is
because we hold that defendants activities in the
instant case simply do not come within the
contemplation of paragraph two. In reviewing a
summary judgment, we must evaluate the facts and
all reasonable inferences fairly drawn therefrom
in a light most favorable to the party opposing
summary judgment.
Guardian State Bank V.
Humpherys, 762 P.2d 1084, 1086 (Utah 1988); Horgan
v.
Industrial Design Corp., 657 P.2d 751, 752
(Utah 1982). Under this standard of review, the
facts in the record clearly indicate that
plaintiff's damages from the runoff surface waters
which are the subject of this action are not the
result of defendant's "management of flood waters
and other natural disasters (or] the construction,
repair, and operation of flood and storm systems."
Defendant school district has no such statutory
responsibility. Branam v. Provo School District,
No. 20935, slip op. at 5 (Utah Sept. 14, 1989).
Rather, plaintiff's damages appear to be the
result of defendant's 1984 resurfacing of the
school parking lot, which caused the runoff to
flow onto plaintiff's property.
The fact that
defendant constructed a diversion curb along the
edge of the parking lot in an effort to retain the
runoff surface waters and divert them into a storm
drain or gutter in front of the properties does
not change our conclusion. We do not believe it
was the legislature's intention in enacting the
1984 amendment to shield defendant from possible
liability for damages arising from its negligence
in the resurfacing of a parking lot, a question of
fact to be determined on remand. Like private
property owners, owners of public property must
exercise reasonable care in controlling surface
water runoff.
15
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780 P.2d at 820-821. Emphasis added.
The odors, vapors and gases from the sewer vent pipe
are, legally, no different that the runoff waters from the
parking lot in Williams and for which the public entity may
be held liable! [Indeed, if there is a difference between
the sewer gases, odors and vapors and the runoff waters, it
is only that in the case at bar that the JORDAN SCHOOL
DISTRICT has intentionally acted to take those gases, vapors
and odors

which would arguably have remained

underground sewer line

in the

and "vent" them into the atmosphere

a mere 13 feet away from Plaintiffs' residence!]
As the Williams decision correctly noted in connection
with

"management

of

flood waters", the

Jordan

School

District in this case has NO STATUTORY RESPONSIBILITY to
manage "hazardous wastes" within the contemplation of the
Governmental Immunity Act.
Somewhat similar results are found in this Court's
decision in Sanford vs University of Utah, 488 P. 2d 741, 26
Utah 2d 285

(1971)

[claims for "nuisance" injuries to

neighbor not immunized under Governmental Immunity Act].
The Act indeed waives immunity (for "nuisance" caused
by "dangerous or defective condition of a public building or
improvement").
16
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Governmental entities are, under Utah law, liable for
the negligent operation of sewer system. See Parrish vs
Layton City, 542 P.2d 1086 (Utah 1975).
The District

having an entire 12-acre "lot" on which

to have its Riverton Elementary School building

should not

be able to position is "vent pipe" so it is a mere 17 feet
away

from

the

Plaintiffs' residence! Furthermore, the

District ought not be allowed to mechanically "vent" those
gases, odors, vapors, etc. into the atmosphere at that
location! It's a nuisance!
The Defendant acknowledged [page 6 of its Memorandum]
that the materials contained within the sewer line (which it
intentionally
Plaintiffs'

vented)

approximately

residence,

are

17

"harmful

feet

from

the

and

hazardous

materials". Nevertheless, the School District attempts to
shield itself under the cloak of immunity under Section 6330-10(18)(c) of the Immunity Act.
Section

63-3 0-9

of

the Governmental

Immunity Act

provides:
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is
waived for any injury caused from a dangerous or
defective condition of any public building,
structure, dam, reservoir or other public
improvement. Immunity is not waived for latent
defective conditions.
Emphasis added. It is Section 9
17
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waiving immunity

which

defeats the District's claims: whether the school building
itself or its sewer line is "defective" or whether the
operation of the sewer vent pipe is "dangerous", immunity is
waived.

The District

now claims

the sewer

gases are

"hazardous materials": to knowingly vent those substances
into the atmosphere immediately adjacent to a home must fall
within the "dangerous condition" for which immunity has been
waived!
The District does not, per se, deny committing those
activities. The District, however, relies entirely on the
"governmental immunity" allegedly afforded it under Section
63-30-10 (18) (c)

["handling,

mitigating

or

regulating

hazardous materials or hazardous wastes"]. The District has
admitted [page 6 of its Memorandum] that the sewer gases and
vapors

are

"hazardous

materials".

That

admission

corroborates the Plaintiff's factual assertions. Certainly
the vent pipe located a few feet from the Plaintiffs' front
door and but a few more feet from the Plaintiffs' backyard
is a "nuisance" in the historic definition of the cause of
action: an action predicated on a dangerous or defective
condition

of

a

public

improvement

that

unreasonably

interferes with the use and enjoyment of the claimant's
property.
18
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B
HYDROGEN SULFIDE GAS, AS A NATURALLY-OCCURRING
BY-PRODUCT OF THE PUTRIFICATION OF DOMESTIC SEWAGE
IN RELATIVELY SMALL QUANTITIES, IS NOT A
"HAZARDOUS MATERIAL" FOR WHICH IMMUNITY ATTACHES
The District submitted no affidavits asserting that the
alleged "nuisance" is not a nuisance; rather, the District
now claims that the gases, odors, fumes are "hazardous
materials" and that it is, as a matter of law, immune from
suit for such activities under Section 63-30-10 (18) (c)
[immunity

is not waived

activities

for liability arising out of

associated with

the

"handling

of hazardous

wastes"]! Not only is this self-serving (at least in the
context

of the instant

litigation),

recently-contrived

assertion (i.e. that the gases are "hazardous materials")
obviously out-of-context within the clear meaning of the
Governmental Immunity Act, Subsection 63-30-10(18) (c) , Utah
Code, but with other applicable legislation as well.
The argument of the Defendant SCHOOL DISTRICT (that it
is "immune from suit") is predicated upon several incorrect
interpretations or application of the law. These incorrect
applications or interpretations are:
1.

That the Legislature intended to grant the

School District "immunity" from suit when, in fact
and/or in law, the District
19
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in reality

was not

"handling,

regulating

or

mitigating"

the

"hazardous" item, because:
a.

"hydrogen sulfide"

gas

emanating

from

("rotten egg")

regular

domestic

sewage is not so defined;
b.

the specific "hydrogen sulfide" gas

allegedly "handled" or "mitigated" by the
School District was NOT so "regulated"
under the environmental protection laws,
even

though

hydrogen

sulfide

in

"industrial strength" quantities might be
regulated.
The legislative construction and analysis necessary to
characterize the "hydrogen sulfide" gas within a sanitary
sewer line as a "hazardous material" is similar to that for
the "hazardous waste", but is even more complex, because the
phrase arguably involves federal law. We must, however,
begin at the starting point: the governmental immunity act.
The argument of the Defendant SCHOOL DISTRICT, to be
jurisprudentially correct if only on the "matter of law"
issue, is as follows:
Subsection 63-30-10 (18) retains "immunity" against
suit

for Section 8

("dangerous condition of
20
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structures") AND for Section 9 ("defective public
building or structure") BUT NOT for Section 10.5
("inverse condemnation") claims

if

"the injury arises out of, in connection
with, or results from:

(18) the activities of:

(c) r e g u l a t i n g ,
mitigating,
or
handling
hazardous
materials or hazardous
wastes

Thus,

as

the

first

step

in

the

"daisy

chain"

(the

undersigned's term) of jurisprudential logic is to determine
whether or not the "hydrogen sulfide" is a "hazardous
material" or a "hazardous waste". As the terms "hazardous
material" and "hazardous waste" are NOT DEFINED within the
Utah Governmental Immunity Act, the Court must refer to
other statutes.
The phrase "hazardous waste" IS DEFINED within state
statute: at Section 19-6-102, "Definitions", as part of the
"Solid and Hazardous Waste Act" of Utah. Under subsection
(9), "hazardous waste" is so "defined" as:
(9) "Hazardous waste" means a solid waste or
21
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combination of solid wastes other than household
waste
which,
because
of
its
quantity,
concentration,
or
physical,
chemical,
or
infectious
characteristics
may
cause
or
significantly increase serious irreversible or
incapacitating reversible illness or may pose a
substantial present or potential hazard to human
health or the environment when improperly treated,
stored, transported, disposed of, or otherwise
managed.
Emphasis added. Thus, for the "hydrogen sulfide" gas to be
a "hazardous waste", it must be a "solid waste", which is
"defined" in Subsection 19-6-102(17), as follows:
(17) (a) "Solid waste" means any garbage, refuse,
sludge, including sludge from a waste treatment
plan, water supply treatment plant, or air
pollution control facility, or other discarded
material, including solid, liquid, semi-solid, or
contained
gaseous
material
resulting
from
industrial, commercial/ mining, or agricultural
operations and from community activities but does
not include sclid or dissolved materials in
domestic sewage or in irrigation return flows or
discharges for which a permit is required under
Title 19, Chapter 5, Water Quality Act, or under
the Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C.,
Section 1251 et seq.
(b) [Subsection (b) identifies and pertains to
certain "excepted" wastes, arguably not applicable
in this situation].
Emphasis added. The first point of analysis would be to
determine

if

the

"hydrogen

sulfide"

(as

a

"gaseous

material") is a "solid". It isn't! That conclusion should
truncate any further need for analysis.
But if we must go further, we look to see if the
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chemical compound results from "industrial, commercial,
mining or agricultural operations". The Appellant believes
the operation of the Riverton Elementary School does not
fall within

those

four

criteria. Continuing

with the

legislative analysis, is the hydrogen sulfide "gaseous
material" result from an otherwise ambiguous "community
activities", a term not elsewhere "defined".
Continuing with the statutory analysis, is the gaseous
material

a

"solid

or dissolved materials

in domestic

sewage"? Arguably so. Does the phrase "domestic sewage"
define or describe the routine sanitary sewer discharges
from the Riverton Elementary School

consisting entirely of

human wastes from the school restroom facilities (sinks and
toilets), drinking fountains, and/or the water discharges
from food-preparation activities conducted within the school
cafeteria?
"school

[While many might jokingly want to designate

cafeteria

food"

as

"hazardous waste", serious

jurisprudence demands a more careful, deliberate analysis of
the wording.] Yes! Does the usage of the phrase "domestic
sewage" in this Section indicate a legislative intent that
this "school domestic sewage" is

IN FACT AND IN LAW

not

materially different in relative volume or in substance than
the sanitary sewer discharges which might be characterized
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as "domestic" (i.e. home, or residential) sewage coming from
a private residence? Yes. [The analysis might arguably be
different if we were dealing with a high school which might
have a chemistry laboratory which utilizes the public sewer
for its waste discharge.] The phrase "domestic sewage" is
not so "defined", so the Court

as with all wording

must

get to a point wherein the commonly-accepted meaning of
common words must be utilized in the statutory construction.
[Note, however, that the phrase "domestic sewage" IS DEFINED
by administrative regulation

as described below

so as to

NOT be a "solid waste", so it (the domestic sewage) could
NOT be a "hazardous waste". ]
Subsection 19-6-502, as "definitions" of the "Solid
Waste Management Act", provides in relevant part:
19-6-502. Definitions.
As used in this part:

(7) "Solid waste" means all putrescible
and
nonputrescible
materials
or
substances discarded or rejected as being
spent, useless, worthless, or in excess
to the owner's needs at the time of
discard or rejection, including garbage,
refuse, industrial and commercial waste,
sludges from air or water control
facilities, irubbish, ashes, contained
gaseous material, incinerator residue,
demolition, and construction debris,
discarded automobiles and offal, but not
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including sewage and other highly diluted
water carried materials or substances and
those in gaseous form.

Emphasis added. It is obvious that the Legislature does not
believe or intend that "sewage" and or wastes "in gaseous
form" be characterized as "solid wastes". The "bottom line"
is that the statutory definition specifically EXCLUDES
"domestic

sewage"

from

the

"definition"

of

"hazardous

waste". That should end the discussion!
The

Riverton

Elementary

School

sanitary

sewer

discharges, including the "gaseous material" in the form of
the hydrogen sulfide

("rotten egg") gas, are contained

within and contemplated by the phrase "domestic sewage" and
thus, "hydrogen sulfide" gas from this type of activity
(i.e. operation of the public school) IS NOT a "hazardous
waste" within the meaning of state statutes, including
Section 63-30-10(18)(c) of the Immunity Act.
If the Defendant SCHOOL DISTRICT were truly entitled to
have the hydrogen sulfide gas characterized as a "hazardous
material" (as so "defined" and "regulated" under the "Solid
and Hazardous Waste Act") as the Legislature may have
intended, then the Defendant SCHOOL DISTRICT must have a
state-issued PERMIT to handle and dispose of that "hazardous
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waste". While production of such a state-issued permit
REQUIRED pursuant to Section 19-6-113 (3) (b) (i) , Utah Code
by the moving party might be discretionary within the
context

of

a

"motion

for

summary

judgment"

context,

production of the "permit" would have been required pursuant
to the Plaintiffs' pre-trial discovery. NO SUCH DOCUMENT WAS
EVER PRODUCED! Thus, the inference must arise that THE
DISTRICT DOES NOT HAVE SUCH A PERMIT. Given the fact that
the state statute prescribes the knowing "disposal" of a
"hazardous waste" as a FELONY, subjecting the responsible
school district personnel to a $50,000 PER DAY "fine" and
imprisonment

for

up

to

five

years

[Subsection

19-6-

113(4)(a)(ii)] and subjecting the Defendant SCHOOL DISTRICT
to a $1,000,000

that's right, A MILLION DOLLARS

fine

[per 19-4-113(4) (c) (ii) , Utah Code.] District personnel who
knowingly dispose of any "hazardous material" in violation
of the Act and knowingly place another person "in imminent
danger of death or serious bodily injury"

Plaintiff SUE

LOVENDAHL believes she has contracted asthma, a life-long
and

serious physiological

condition

from

the

repeated

exposure to the sanitary sewer gases intentionally "vented"
upon her

can be subjected to a fine of $250,000 and 15

years imprisonment. Section 19-6-113 (4) (c) (ii) , Utah Code.]
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THE DISTRICT DIDN'T PRODUCE A "PERMIT" BECAUSE IT DOESN'T
HAVE A "PERMIT"!
The District's singular evidence on this specific point
is the assertion of Mr Randal Haslam, an architect
TRAINED CHEMIST OR ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENTIST, per se

NOT A
that

the odorous gas the District was attempting to "dispose of"
was "hydrogen sulfide".
Obviously, counsel's cavalier characterization of the
hydrogen sulfide as a "hazardous material" is severely
misplaced! Similarly, if the "disposal" of a "hazardous
waste" is so serious that is so severely punishable, it is
doubtful

ludicrous

is more accurate

that the State

authorities would even authorize, through the "permit", the
UNCONTROLLED and UNSUPERVISED discharge of the "hazardous
waste",

into

the

atmosphere

and

in

a

RESIDENTIAL

NEIGHBORHOOD, a mere 17 feet away from the Plaintiffs'
nearby residence! The Defendant SCHOOL DISTRICT cannot now
be seriously heard to claim

as it does

the gases are

"hazardous wastes".
The Defendant claims that the sewer gases, odors, etc.
are "hazardous materials". This then raises the rhetorical
question: if the odors, etc., are "hazardous materials",
does the District have a state-issued "permit" under the
27

Hazardous Substances Mitigation Act to handle and process
such materials? The District hasn't provided such a permit.
Similarly, would
activity
Section

the State of Utah

"license" such an

for which there is a $10,000 per day "fine" [per
19-6-306, Utah

Code]

for

a violation

to be

conducted a mere 17 feet away from an occupied residential
dwelling? None was ever produced by the District!
The

District's

argument,

as

a

"daisy

chain"

of

ostensibly interconnected2 statutes and regulations, begins
with state statute
arguably

ends,

(the Governmental Immunity Act) and

in part,

in the

federal

statutes

and

regulations promulgated by the national government and its
agencies. THE

"DAISY CHAIN" CONNECTION HAS SOME MAJOR

"HOLES" IN IT AND DOES NOT SUPPORT THE DEFENDANT'S SELFSERVING INTERPRETATION AND CONCLUSIONS. The "daisy chain"
connection obviously overlooks the express provisions of the
statutes and regulations!
The Defendant SCHOOL DISTRICT has attempted
the trial court was successful

and at

in "playing fast and loose"

with the operational and substantive "definitions" of term-

2

Judge Nehring of the District Court openly acknowledged
during the oral argument at the summary judgment hearing that he
was "unable to follow" the various statutes and regulations and the
Defendant's attempted interwoven relationship between them.
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of-art phrases. The Appellants' analysis will attempt to be
more careful.
C
ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS EXPRESSLY PROVIDE
THAT DOMESTIC SEWAGE
IS NOT A "HAZARDOUS WASTE"
The Plaintiffs' interpretation

(that the hydrogen

sulfide is NOT "hazardous waste") is further bolstered by
the administrative agency regulations adopted pursuant to
statutory authority [Section 19-6-106, Utah Code] and for
the purpose of implementing and enforcing those regulatory
functions.
Administrative Regulation R315-1-1, pertaining to "Utah
Hazardous Waste Definitions and References", incorporates
for the purposes of the "administrative regulations" the
statutory definitions contained in Sections 19-6-102, Utah
Code. R315-1-1. The administrative

regulations EXCLUDE

"domestic sewage" from being a "solid waste", which thus
precludes those materials from being a "hazardous waste", by
providing in relevant part:
R315-2-4. Exclusions.
(a) MATERIALS WHICH ARE NOT SOLID WASTES.
The following materials are not solid wastes for
the purposes of this rule:
(1) Domestic sewage or any mixture of
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domestic sewage and other wastes that
passes through a sewer system to a
publicly-owned
treatment
works
for
treatment.
"Domestic
sewage" means
untreated sanitary wastes that pass
through a sewer system.
Emphasis added. The Riverton Elementary School sanitary
sewer wastes at issue in this litigation are "untreated
sanitary wastes that pass through a sewer system", per the
second

sentence

of

the

"definition".

Thus,

working

backwards, the "domestic sewage" is not a "solid waste" and
thus it is not a "hazardous waste". End of discussion!
[Arguably, the foregoing "definitions" and analysis might be
restricted by narrowing language
regulations

within the statute or the

such as "for the purpose of this rule" or

words of similar import. The Appellants caution the Court
against

indulging

in

such

a

limiting

"definitional"

endeavor, as might be suggested by the Defendant SCHOOL
DISTRICT. Do so leads to absurd results.]
D
SEWER LINE "HYDROGEN SULFIDE" GAS
IS NOT A "HAZARDOUS MATERIAL"
UNDER FEDERAL REGULATIONS
Subsection

19-6-302

of

the

"Hazardous

Substances

Mitigation Act" of Utah defines "hazardous materials", by
providing in relevant part:
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19-6-3 02. Definitions.
As used in this part:

(7) "Hazardous
materials"
means
hazardous waste as defined in the Utah
Hazardous Waste Management Regulations,
PCBs, dioxin, asbestos, or a substance
regulated under 42 U.S.C., Section
6991(2).

Emphasis added.
It is noteworthy that although Section 19-6-302(7)
"defines" the phrase

"hazardous materials", the phrase

"hazardous materials" IS NOT FURTHER EVEN MENTIONED within
the remainder of the statutory provisions. The statute
utilizes instead the phrase "hazardous substances", which is
"defined" at Section 19-6-302(8), as follows:
(8) "Hazardous substances" means the definition of
hazardous substances contained in CERCLA [a
federal statute for environmental protection]
Bracketed material added for clarity. Note that the phrase
"hazardous

substances"

distinguishable

is,

thus,

from the phrase

different- from

and

"hazardous materials".

Although "hazardous substances" is not so utilized in the
remainder of the statute, the phrase "hazardous materials"
is nevertheless so "defined" to be one of the following
items:
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1. a "hazardous waste" as defined in the Utah
Hazardous Waste Management Regulations;
2.

a PCB;

3.

dioxin;

4.

asbestos; or

5. a substance regulated under 42 U.S. C. , Section
6991(2).
Emphasis added.
The analysis shown above evidences that the hydrogen
sulfide IS NOT a "hazardous waste as defined in the Utah
Hazardous Waste Management
dispute

Regulations".

It

is beyond

and the Defendant SCHOOL DISTRICT does not claim--

-that "hydrogen sulfide" gas is NOT "a PCB", "dioxin", or
"asbestos".
The DISTRICT does, however, claim that the "hydrogen
sulfide" is "a substance regulated under 42 U.S.C., Section
6991." In analyzing the meaning of the federal statutes, one
must first consider what the Utah Legislature had in mind
when it utilized the words "a substance regulated under 42
U.S.C., Section 6991(2)".
In

the

"regulation"

instant
of

the

situation,
hydrogen

there

sulfide

is

NO

"vented"

FACTUAL
by

the

District from its sewer line at the Riverton Elementary
School! In this context, the Utah Legislature utilized the
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word "regulated"

as contrasted with the word "defined".

The wording "regulated under" connotes a FACTUAL REGULATION.
The Defendant SCHOOL DISTRICT did not show
Plaintiffs

have always

disputed

that

the

and the

sewer line

"hydrogen sulfide" and its disposition is thus FACTUALLY
"regulated". To the contrary, the District seems to be able
to merely dispose of the hydrogen sulfide at its whim:
blowing as much as it can into the atmosphere. NO PERMIT
FROM THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT OR ITS AGENCIES TO DO SO HAS
BEEN PRODUCED

either in the Defendant's responses to

Plaintiff's "pre-trial discovery" (which asked, inter alia,
for such documentation and information) or to the District
Court at the summary judgment hearing! So the question
arises as to the intention of the Utah Legislature, with
respect to the usage of the term "regulated". Obviously, the
District is not at all acting as though its disposal of the
hydrogen sulfide gas is so "regulated": through the federal
permitting process, with fines, etc. if the law isn't
followed. On the contrary, the District has blown as much as
it can into the atmosphere!
The Defendant has asserted

[page 6 of its District

Court SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM] that the Utah Hazardous
Wastes Board has adopted

through inclusion of the federal
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statutory provisions

a definition to include hydrogen

sulfide in its listing of "hazardous waste". The Defendants
argument is in error! Defendant asserts:
The Board's administrative Rule R315-l-l(b)
adopts, with revisions not pertinent here, "the
terms defined in 40 CFR 260.10. Section 260.10
defines the term "hazardous waste" as "a hazardous
waste as defined in §261.3 of this chapter.
Section 261.3, in turn, defines hazardous waste as
a solid waste which is not excluded by another
section (again not pertinent here) which meets any
of certain listed criteria.
Page 6 of Defendant's SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM. RECORD AT
210. Emphasis added.
The quoted paragraph grossly misstates the law on this
subject. Section 261.4, pertaining to "Exclusions", (which
was expressly not quoted and which was claimed to be "not
pertinent"), is ABSOLUTELY PERTINENT, when it provides:
§261.4

Exclusions.

(a) Materials which are not solid wastes. The
following materials are not solid wastes for the
purposes of this part:
(1)(i) Domestic sewage; and
(ii)
Any mixture of domestic sewage
and other wastes that passes through a
sewer
system
to
a
publicly-owned
treatment works for treatment. "Domestic
sewage" means untreated sanitary wastes
that pass through a sewer system.
Emphasis

added.

It is obvious that

the Defendant

has

conveniently ignored the provisions of the controlling
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regulation!
In similar vein, Defendant's assertion that the listing
of "hydrogen sulfide" within 40 C.F.R. §261.33 is similarly
incorrect and out of context! This inappropriateness
bordering upon an affirmative misleading of the Court as a
matter of law

is illustrated by a careful reading of the

federal regulation, as follows:
§261.33 Discarded commercial chemical products,
off-specification species, container residues, and
spill residues thereof.
The following materials or items are hazardous
wastes if and when they are discarded or intended
to be discarded as described in §261.2(a)(2)(i),
when they are mixed with waste oil or used oil or
other material and applied to the land for dust
suppression or road treatment, when they are
otherwise applied to the land in lieu of their
original intended use or when they are contained
in products that are applied to the land when, in
lieu of their original intended use, they are
produced for use as (or as a component of) a fuel,
distributed for use as a fuel, or burned as a
fuel.

(f) The
commercial
chemical
products,
manufacturing chemical intermediates, or offspecification
commercial
chemical
products
referred to in paragraphs (a) through (d) of this
section, are identified as toxic wastes (T) ,
unless otherwise designated and are subject to the
small quantity generator exclusion defined in
§261.5 (a) and (g) . These wastes and their
corresponding EPA Hazardous Waste Numbers are:
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U-135

7783-06-4

Hydrogen sulfide H2S

Emphasis added. That "hydrogen sulfide" is so listed does
not mean that is a "hazardous waste". To the contrary! The
"listing"

is

grossly

out-of-context,

and

almost

intentionally so.
The

Defendant's

provisions"

and/or

analysis

of

the

the applicability

other

or

"federal

interpretation

thereof is similarly flawed. It is ludicrous to think that
the federal Clean Air Act designates "hydrogen sulfide" as
a "hazardous material"

as Defendant claims

and yet the

Defendant, WITHOUT ANY KIND OF PERMIT OR RESTRICTION is
allowed,

with

apparent

impunity,

to

discharge

untold

quantities of that pollutant into the atmosphere!
It is no wonder that the District Court "could not
follow1'

the

principles

Defendant's

explanation

as

to

as to why the sewer gases were

the

legal

"hazardous

materials". That the Defendant apparently intentionally
chose to not include these provisions within its brief must
have been intentional: so as to mislead the Court.
In

the

"regulation"

instant
of

situation,

the hydrogen

there

sulfide

is

NO

"vented"

FACTUAL
by

the

District from its sewer line, IN UNCONTROLLED QUANTITIES
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INTO THE ATMOSPHERE! In this context, the Utah Legislature
utilized the word "regulated"

as contrasted with the word

"defined". The wording "regulated under" connotes a FACTUAL
REGULATION.

The

hydrogen

sulfide

is

not

FACTUALLY

"regulated".
That "hydrogen sulfide" is so listed does not mean that
such a "listing" is grossly out-of-context, and almost
intentionally so. The "hydrogen sulfide" with which we are
here dealing is not the same "hydrogen sulfide" as described
to be a "commercial chemical product", applied "to the
land", etc. The "hydrogen sulfide" gas, in relatively minute
quantities within the "domestic sewage" from the Riverton
Elementary School, are not and were not intended to be
"discarded" as described in the federal regulations! The
mere "listing" of the "hydrogen sulfide" chemical within a
long "laundry list" enumeration of chemical substances does
not make the Riverton Elementary School "hydrogen sulfide"
a

"hazardous material" or

introductory text
expressly

"hazardous waste", when the

(and other regulations) obviously and

mandate

a

contrary

conclusion.

The

FEDERAL

REGULATIONS, as cited by the Defendant, DO NOT APPLY TO THE
CASE

AT

HAND!

The

citation

of

those

regulations

inappropriate and intentionally-misleading.
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is

It is no wonder that the District Court "could not
follow"

the

Defendant's

explanation

as

to

the

legal

principles as to why the gases were "hazardous materials".
Obviously, the Defendant's claimed statutory defense
(i.e. immunity not waived for activities related to the
"handling of hazardous materials or hazardous wastes" is an
illusory argument, born of desperation and not deserving of
judicial belief or application!] It is incredible that the
District Court

openly acknowledging that it "could not

follow" the "daisy chain" analysis and argument

would

nevertheless "buy into" that same argument and grant summary
judgment. That judgment must be overturned!
II
IMMUNITY HAS BEEN WAIVED
FOR "INVERSE CONDEMNATION" CLAIMS
The Riverton Elementary School is located on a 12-acre
site. The vent pipe is at the extreme northeast corner of
the parcel, hundreds and hundreds of feet away from the
school building and almost at the extreme perimeter of the
school property. The vent pipe is a mere 5 feet from the
Plaintiffs' property line and a mere 17 feet from the corner
of the Plaintiffs' residence. The "vented" odors, vapors,
fumes and gases sucked from the sewer line surround the vent
and unreasonably interfere with the use of the residential
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property. In essence and in actuality, the DISTRICT has
"condemned" and "taken" the Plaintiffs' private property as
much as if the DISTRICT were to have initiated and pursued
a formal eminent domain proceeding to acquire sufficient
real estate for the de facto dumping ground!
Subsection 63-30-10.5(1) of the Act clearly provides:
(1) As provided by Article I, Section 22 of the
Utah Constitution, immunity from suit of all
government entities is waived for the recovery of
compensation from the governmental entity when the
governmental entity has taken or damaged private
property
for
public
uses
without
just
compensation.
Emphasis added. The intentional and foreseeable use of the
Plaintiffs' real estate as a "dumping ground" for the
"hazardous materials" odors, vapors, gases and fumes from
the sanitary sewer system is as much of a "taking" and a
"damaging" as if the DISTRICT had formally "condemned" the
property! That the property was so "taken" or "damaged" FOR
PUBLIC USES is confirmed by the fact that the DISTRICT
didn't want the fumes, odors, etc. in the Elementary School,
so it intentionally "dumped" them nearby on the Plaintiff's
real estate!
Before the trial court the District asserted, but did
not present any "hard evidence" (such as sworn affidavits or
the actual depositions), that the Plaintiffs had testified
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they had no professional appraisal evidence to indicate a
permanent diminution in value to their real estate. Such was
(and is) a blatant mischaracterization of the Plaintiffs'
position and testimony.
Had such "answers to interrogatories" and "depositions"
actually been "published" and "presented" to the Court, they
would have evidenced a consistently

clear picture, as

alleged by the Plaintiffs, as follows:
Q. [by Mr Ostler] So you think that the soil is
somehow contaminated by the gases?
A. [by Sue Lovendahl] Yes, I do.
Q. Do you have any basis in fact other than
supposition, for that assertion?
A. Dead lawn, dead flowers, dead trees.
Q. And that's still the case today?
A.
It's better today, but there's still areas in
the front yard that you can't plant or do anything
with.
Q. And the pipe isn't there any longer; correct?
A. No, it's not.
Q. And you're claiming that the fact that the
pipe was one there is killing your lawn and your
trees.
A.
It killed them. It's not killing them now.
They're no longer there.
Affidavit of Sue Lovendahl, page 13, lines 9 through 23.
Emphasis added.
The Plaintiffs' responses contained within "answers to
interrogatories" are supportive of the "damaging" claim:
INTERROGATORY No. 11. State whether you claim a
pecuniary loss as a result of the nuisance and if
so, state:
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a. The nature and amount of each loss;
b. The date of each loss; and
c. The identify of each document containing
information
about
the
answer
to
this
Interrogatory.
ANSWER/RESPONSE: . . . The grass in the backyard
lawn of the residence died completely; in the
frontyard a portion of the lawn died. Following
the installation and operation of the "vent" pipe,
the decorative flowers did not grow as well as in
the past. The family members could not work in the
yard without risk of a full-blown asthma "attack",
which was never experienced before the "vent" pipe
was installed and operated. A person could not
walk outside into the yard from the house without
the odor almost knocking one over. A person could
not cook outside on the barbecue because of the
strong odor coming from the "vent" pipe. The odors
from the outside were "sucked" into the residence
through operation of the swamp cooler during
summer months.
After exposure to the odor and gases, it
seemed as if one's nose was stuffed with cotton.
The full effect of the smell was not known until
visitors would come to our home and say "What is
that smell?"
We considered selling the house, but the
realtor with whom we consulted indicated we would
have to disclose the existence of the "vent" pipe
and possibly pay for some testing of it. We
decided to forego selling until we could do
something about the "vent" pipe.
The Plaintiffs believe that their unwilling
subjection to the harmful, dangerous and offensive
odors, gases and vapors, from the sanitary sewer
through the District-installed "vent" pipe, when
the District knew of the "nuisance" it was
intentionally creating, together with the lifelong exposure to asthma, asthma-like and flu-like
symptoms justifies their claim of $50,000
compensatory damages for each of the three
plaintiffs [$150,000 total], plus court costs and
attorney's
fees
incurred
in bringing
and
maintaining this action.
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INTERROGATORY No. 12. Identify
each
document
which you claim supports your allegation that a
nuisance exists on the property.
ANSWER/RESPONSE: The
documents
provided
in
Defendant's responses to Plaintiffs' First Set of
Requests for Production of Documents.
See also the documents identified or referred to
in the answer/response to other Interrogatories.
INTERROGATORY No. 13. State the degree of taking
which you claim upon the property and each and
every act which you allege constitutes the taking.
ANSWER/RESPONSE: S e e
the
Plaintiffs'
answer/response to Interrogatories No. 11, above.
The Defendant Jordan School District, rather than
having the harmful gases, odors and vapors fall
upon its own large parcel, thus endangering its
own employees and the schoolchildren entrusted to
its care, located the sanitary sewer "vent" pipe
to be immediately adjacent to the Plaintiffs'
residence. The Defendant Jordan School District
knew or should have known of the offensive and
dangerous condition it was creating in "venting"
large quantities of such odors, gases and vapors
into
the
atmosphere.
The
"taking"
of
the
Plaintiffs' property and/or the unreasonable
interference with the reasonable usage of that
real property was just as effectively accomplished
as if the governmental
entity
(the school
district) had initiated and consummated eminent
domain proceedings to acquire the real estate for
that very purpose: as a "dumping ground" for the
offensive odors, etc., from the sanitary sewer!
Answers to Interrogatories. Dated as of 22 May 1999. Signed
under oath by Sue Lovendahl. Emphasis added.
Obviously,

there

"private property"

of

was
the

substantial

"damage"

Plaintiffs. That

to

the

Defendant's

counsel would, in self-serving fashion, represent to the
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Court that there was no permanent damage to Plaintiffs' real
estate is misleading, at best. First, because when the
depositions had actually been taken (in September 2000) , the
sewer "vent pipe" had been "capped"

pursuant to Court

order (preliminary injunction), issued in March 1998, some
two and one-half years earlier! That the damage did not
result in a permanent taking, does not mean that there was
not the "damaging" identified!

It

is

obvious

that

the

"property taken or damaged" claim is and was viable. That
counsel would tend to characterize the Plaintiffs' claims as
being not permanent, so therefore they weren't for "damage"
to the property is simply a mischaracterization of fact!
Subsequent to the installation of the sewer vent pipe,
Plaintiff SUE LOVENDAHL, who had no previously-diagnosed
symptoms or family-history thereof, contracted asthma

a

disease of the lungs. [Although the other co-plaintiffs
JAMES LOVENDAHL and WESLEY LOVENDAHL developed temporary
symptoms

headaches, nausea, etc.

during their exposure

to the sewer gases prior to the "capping" of the vent pipe,
they have as of the present not been medically diagnosed
with any permanent damage.] Are not her "lungs" the "private
property" which has been "damaged" for "public use" (i.e.
the venting of the sewer gases so close to her home)?
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As no evidence was actually before the Court at the
"summary judgment hearing" on the "taking or damaging"
issue, there was no basis for the Court to make any
"findings" on that factually-intensive issue!
Similarly, the trial court erred in its ruling. The
"inverse condemnation" claims under Section 63-30-10.5 are
not subject to retained immunity; for such claims immunity
has been waived and their is NO RETENTION of immunity,
notwithstanding Section 63-30-10. See Hansen vs Salt Lake
County,

794 P.2d

838

(Utah 1990),

in which the Court

observed:
. . . we now make clear that governmental immunity
cannot apply to prohibit suit or recovery under an
inverse condemnation theory. That would be
unconstitutional under the interpretation we have
given article I, section 22 in Colman.
Id. at 794. Emphasis added.
Indeed, any argument that the Governmental Immunity Act
can otherwise restrict or limit
claims brought

"inverse condemnation"

as this case so is

under the "self-

executing" provisions of Article I, Section 22 of the Utah
Constitution

would themselves be unconstitutional. The

Legislature itself

in adoption of Section 63-3 0-10 . 5

has

clearly not intended a retention of immunity. The District
Court

incorrectly

concluding
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that

63-30-10(18) (c)

"trumped" everything

should not be allowed to override

both the Constitution and the express terms of the Act, in
compliance with the Constitution!
IV
ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS REQUIRING THE DISTRICT
TO MAINTAIN ODOR-FREE CLASSROOMS CANNOT BE CONSTRUED
TO SHIELD THE DISTRICT FROM IMMUNITY FOR NUISANCE OR
FROM "INVERSE CONDEMNATION" CLAIMS
The Defendant claimed
the

District

regulation

was

to keep

in the District Court

mandated
the

by

state

classrooms

"odor

that

administrative
free". Those

arguments, insofar as "authority" for immunity from the
"nuisance" and/or "taking" claims of the Plaintiffs, are
misplaced. While the administrative regulations [R392-200-1
and R392-200-6 (2) (b) ] generally require the District to have
odor-free

classrooms,

those

provisions

are

merely

suggestive. The Defendant IGNORES the effect of Regulation
R392-200(3) (J), which provides as follows:
J.

Hazardous Wastes

1. General. Disposal of hazardous wastes shall
comply with the Utah hazardous waste management
rules and applicable local regulations.
Emphasis added. The State School Board, as promulgator of
those administrative regulations, obviously intended that
the Jordan School District follow "the law" rather than
become a law unto itself.
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CONCLUSION
The

District

Court's

immunity) based upon

ruling

(as

to

the fast-and-loose

retention

of

"daisy chain"

recitation of federal regulations and statutes, out-ofcontext, is flawed. The Utah statutes expressly exclude the
"domestic sewage"

(which is what the effluent from the

Riverton Elementary School really is) from being "hazardous
wastes" (and/or "hazardous materials"). Consequently, the
Plaintiffs' claims for "nuisance" should stand.
Similarly, the District Court's ruling dismissing the
"inverse condemnation" was erroneous. First, because the
facts with respect to the "damaging" or "taking" were in
dispute. [Plaintiff submitted no hard evidence (affidavits,
etc.) to show otherwise.] Secondly, the District Court
improperly assumed that the provisions of Section 63-30-10
[immunity retained] superseded the provisions of Section 633 0-10.5 [immunity waived for inverse condemnation claims].
That decision mus-t be reversed.
The

Defendant's

assertions

as

to

entitlement

to

immunity and/or summary judgment due to its attempt to
comply with the "clean indoor air" regulations promulgated
by the State School Board are likewise spurious.
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Respec tfully submitted this 9th day of October, 2001.

Atbtirney^for Appellants
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WESLEY LOVENDAHL
CERTIFICATE
I certify that I caused two copies of the foregoing
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Blake T Ostler, Attorney at Law, Burbidge, Carnahan, Ostler
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City, Utah 84144, this 9th day of October, 2001.
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